PART 4: NEAR MISS AT DAVIS’ CROSSROADS

This is the fourth and concluding installment of a reprint of an article of mine that was originally featured in the July 1998 issue of the magazine “America’s Civil War.”

Stanley, “finding that it would be necessary…to remain on or near the left in order to observe the enemy in that quarter…gave Colonel Stoughton, who was on the right, direction to act at his discretion with his regiment and the section of artillery on his right.” Stoughton also sent out one of his companies as skirmishers. But he soon found his hands were full, directing the men of his regiment as well as the section of artillery to keep the determined enemy at bay. Captain Robert J. Waggener, Stanley’s assistant adjutant general, seeing the crisis developing on the right, assisted Stoughton by ordering the 18th Ohio from its reserve position to strengthen the flank. The Ohio regiment struggled to hold back the Rebel tide.

To the brigade’s front, the Confederates who were in the field between Stanley’s defenders and Chickamauga Creek remained on their bellies. Yet one of their batteries, Stanley noted, threw “shell and grape with remarkable precision.”

Stanley rode to the hard-pressed right flank to check with Stoughton. Smoke rolled over the crouched Federals as they rapidly fired and reloaded, showing no signs of hesitation. With deep concern, Stanley and Stoughton watched the Confederates as they slowly, stubbornly pressed their way forward through the corn, threatening not only the right flank but also the brigade’s route of retreat toward Bailey’s Cross Roads and the rest of the XIV Corps. As King related, “The battle raged fiercely for more than an hour. The enemy kept advancing his line despite the destructive fire poured into him from Union troops.”

Major Bennet described the action plainly: “We had a sharp battle for an hour, it was terrific, but we held the rebels in check until we had our ammunition and provision train all in motion to the rear.”

When the division train had been safely withdrawn toward Stevens’ Gap, Negley ordered Stanley to have his brigade fall back. Speed was essential. Negley told Stanley that the four pieces of artillery that had been protecting the brigade’s left “were withdrawn without my order, this leaving me at that point at the mercy of the well-directed fire of the enemy’s artillery.”

The small 18th Ohio continued to buckle under the pressure of the enemy’s advance. Seeing this, Stanley ordered it to be withdrawn first. Captain Waggener managed to rally the scattered regiment and help reform it while the artillery on the right flank limbered up and retreated to the rear.

“When the enemy reached within twenty rods of the line of Union breastworks the brigade fell back over the ridge,” James King recalled, “the most of the men leaving their knapsacks and blankets where they had laid them when they built the barricade.” Twenty-year-old Daniel Rose of the 11th Michigan lamented, “We had to withdraw in a hurry and left our knapsacks with [the Confederates] so I lost nearly everything I had: paper, envelopes, and stamps and my pictures.”

Lieutenant Bordon M. Hicks of Company E left behind a tongue-in-cheek appraisal of the regiment’s hasty departure: “We had thrown off our knapsacks in order to work more freely, I had hung my haversack on the limb of a tree, we were ordered to fall back and take position behind one of the other brigades. The enemy were so close on us that the boys left their knapsacks, and never saw one again while in the service. I had gotten back about two or three rods, when I realized I had deserted my base of supplies, so back I charged into the teeth of the enemy, and snatched my haversack from the teeth of the enemy. This was a very brave and heroic deed, and yet it was not reported to the General Commanding, neither had Congress ever voted me a medal of Honor, and no song has ever been dedicated entitled, ‘Oh save my knapsack.’ ” Hicks, always a wag, was referring to the song “Who Will Save The Left?” which George Root had written about the 19th Illinois after Stones River.

Stanley’s brigade did not disintegrate before the pursuing enemy, however. The regiments retired in line of battle, faced by the rear rank, ready at any time to confront the enemy. Descending the ridge, the brigade moved by left flank into the road and retreated to a position at the rear of the other brigades. When the Confederates reached the ridge vacated by the 2nd Brigade, they were raked by a terrific fire from Sirwell’s and Beatty’s brigades, which caused them to recoil and seek shelter behind the ridge.

Evening found Thomas’ corps safely concentrated around Stevens’ Gap, along with nearly 400 wagons from Negley’s and Baird’s divisions. If not for Hindman’s hesitation and the stubborn rear-guard action of Stanley’s brigade, a large portion of XIV Corps might have been destroyed, and portions of Braggs’ army would have been wedged dangerously between Major General Thomas L. Crittenden’s XXI Corps to the north and Major General Alexander M. McCook’s XX Corps to the south. Stanley reported his losses as five killed, 29 wounded and four missing. After the battle, Rosecrans recommended Stanley for promotion to brigadier general.

A week later, at the Battle of Chickamauga, Stanley would be wounded and Colonel Stoughton of the 11th Michigan would take command of the brigade. Again Stoughton’s men would fight a rear-guard action against Bragg’s Army of Tennessee. This time it would be on a hill owned by a farmer named George Washington Snodgrass, and the stand at Snodgrass Hill would save Rosecrans’ army one more time. Had it not been for the stands at McLemore’s Cover and Snodgrass Hill, the Confederates might have crushed the Army of the Cumberland, retaken Chattanooga and quite possibly reversed the entire course of the Civil War.

Visit My Author Page On Facebook And Place Your Vote!

I’ve set up an author’s page on Facebook in anticipation of the release of my debut novel, The Prodigal. Stop by today and weigh in on which book jacket blurb you like best for The Prodigal:  http://www.facebook.com/S.K.Keogh

BOOK REVIEW: THE JACKASS FRIGATE

This is the second book in Alaric Bond’s “Fighting Sail” series. I previously reviewed the first book in the series, His Majesty’s Ship, on this blog.

Like His Majesty’s Ship, Mr. Bond does a fine job with this tale of the voyage of Pandora (the jackass frigate herself). What is a jackass frigate, you ask? I will encourage you to read the book to find out.

There are many series of novels in the sub-genre of Age of Sail fiction. However, I have found only a few whose first book encouraged me to read further in the series. Mr. Bond’s first effort, however, did so entice me to travel onward. The Jackass Frigate did not disappoint, and I look forward to the rest of the series.

What attracts me the most to the “Fighting Sail” series is Bond’s attention to the men of the lower deck. So much of this genre is populated by characters who are officers in the Royal Navy, so Bond’s approach is refreshing. While he does not neglect the upper ranks, the common jack tar gets equal billing.

Like the first book, The Jackass Frigate has multiple viewpoint characters, sometimes changing within individual scenes, but Bond has the ability to keep the reader’s focus clear. His relatively short scenes and forward flow of narrative makes the book an easy read.

One of the sub-plots I enjoyed was the “ghost” who appeared here and there throughout most of the story, though I admit I almost wished that thread had run a bit longer. However, I can see why Bond revealed the truth behind the “ghost” because shortly thereafter is when the book crescendos to its climactic scene–a fleet action with the Spanish, during which the Pandora serves as signal ship for the British line-of-battle ships.

I’m not someone who reads historical fiction to “meet” real-life people as characters, but I did enjoy Bond including the famous Lord Nelson in the final battle. This was the first time I had seen an author rise to that challenge, and Bond does a seamless treatment of the fabled naval hero.

Stay tuned for a review of the series’ third installment, True Colours.

PART 3: NEAR MISS AT DAVIS’ CROSSROADS

This is the third installment of a reprint of an article of mine that was originally featured in the July 1998 issue of the magazine “America’s Civil War.”

As dawn crept over Pigeon Mountain on September 11, [General George H.] Thomas was relieved to see that two more of his brigades, Colonel Benjamin F. Scribner’s and Brigadier General John Starkweather’s, had arrived. [Confederate General] Hindman still delayed his advance, and the morning slipped away while Cleburne waited in vain for the sounds of Hindman’s guns–the signal for Cleburne to begin his own attack.

With visibility in the cove limited due to the trees and hills, [Maj. General James] Negley desperately wanted to know what was happening around him. Second Lieutenant Stephen P. Marsh of Company A, 11th Michigan [Infantry], volunteered to find out. [Sergeant James] King described the scene: “Lieutenant Marsh, at the risk of his life from the enemy’s sharpshooters, climbed a tall tree where he could gain a view of the surrounding country. General Negley and staff were under the tree and the lieutenant announced that he could see a heavy column of infantry moving around the left flank of Negley’s line.”

His fears now confirmed, Negley ordered the 2nd Division’s large supply train back to Bailey’s Crossroads. Scribner and Starkweather would withdraw as well. With these two brigades in motion, Beatty’s and Sirwell’s brigades began their retrograde movement westward, leaving Stanley’s brigade behind to buy time.

Stanley, a 53-year-old lawyer and native of Connecticut, had under his command his former regiment, the 18th Ohio, along with the 11th Michigan and another regiment that had fought at Stones River, the 19th Illinois. The brigade’s fourth regiment, the 69th Ohio, was detached to Colonel Daniel McCook’s brigade of the Reserve Corps. Together, the three regiments could barely muster 800 men.

King reported that Stanley’s brigade remained in line while the two other brigades secured strong positions in the rear. Pressed by Confederate skirmishers, Stanley’s brigade fell back across Chickamauga Creek and took up a position on a ridge in an open field adjoining the creek. One brigade member, Major Benjamin Bennet of the 11th Michigan, wrote in a letter to a Michigan newspaper, the Western Chronicle: “We soon found that we had stirred up a hornets nest. The rebels outnumbering [us] at least five to one.”

Stanley halted his command on a small north-south ridge and deployed his men. Sirwell’s and Beatty’s brigades formed on a ridge behind Stanley’s position. In his after-action report, Stanley explained: “I placed the 19th Illinois and 11th Michigan in line on the slope in front of the Fourth Indiana Battery and in rear of a fence, directing them to build breastworks of rails and stones to protect them from musketry… The 18th Ohio I placed in double column as a reserve… Battery M, 1st Ohio Artillery, was ordered to take position on the side of the hill in my rear.” Two companies of the 19th Illinois were sent forward. J. Henry Haynie, a member of that regiment, recalled, “Company I was posted to the right and front, behind a barn, while Company K was sent to the left and front, to take position behind a stone wall which commanded the road.”

The Confederates’ golden opportunity was rapidly slipping away from them. An exasperated Bragg sent Hindman a final directive: “The attack which was ordered at daybreak must be made at once or it will be too late.”

As the Southern forces pressed westward toward Chickamauga Creek and the Federal rearguard, they flushed out a company of the 24th Illinois from Starkweather’s brigade that had been left behind. The company took refuge behind the stone wall on the west side of the creek with their fellow Illinoisans of the 19th. Two members of the 24th, however, had fallen even farther behind. The Rebel yell pierced the air, coming from the woods on the creek’s east side, and the Federal troops on the ridge saw mounted Confederates in hot pursuit of the two men from the 24th Illinois. Alfred Hough described the result: “They came up cheering, thinking we were all on the next hill, but their cheering suddenly turned to wailing.” From behind the stone wall, the two combined companies delivered a devastating volley into the horsemen, unseating “all of the pursuing party who were in sight,” killing 13 and wounding several others. This put an abrupt end to any further advance on that flank.

Finally, Hindman sent his men forward. The Federals commenced firing as the Confederates crossed Chickamauga Creek. Captain Frederick Schultz’s Battery M, 1st Ohio Artillery, “opened on the enemy, firing over us with one section, and worked with good effect,” Stanley reported. On the brigade’s right flank, bayonets glistened among the tall stalks of a large cornfield. The Confederates concentrated on the flank, but Schultz’s guns raked the cornfield with canister fire, holding the Rebels at bay. Yet soon, Stanley noted, “The enemy placed a battery in position, which was well handled and did terrible execution, especially upon the 18th Ohio, which had been placed on the right flank to guard against the enemy, who appeared there in strong force.” King added, “A number of pieces of Confederate artillery were pushed forward by hand through the cornfield, followed by several lines of infantry closed en masse.”

Although the Union regiments had the advantage of the higher ground and breastworks, casualties mounted. Sergeant James Lovette of the 11th Michigan had both his legs taken off above the knees by cannon fire. Six others from the regiment would also be wounded before the engagement was over. Sergeant Elmer Bradley and newly promoted Corporal Oliver Brockway of Company K already had been captured while on picket duty that day (they would both later die at Andersonville prison).

Pressure increased from Hindman’s and Cleburne’s attacks. Confederate Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson remembered, “Never were troops in better spirit and more eager to meet the foe.”

Stay tuned for the fourth and final installment of this article.

PART 2: NEAR MISS AT DAVIS’ CROSSROADS

This is the second installment of a reprint of an article of mine that was originally featured in the July 1998 issue of the magazine “America’s Civil War.”

 

Alfred Lacy Hough, an officer on [Major General James] Negley’s staff, reflected years later, “We supposed the enemy were in full retreat and our object was to intercept them, but we were mistaken, their intention was to drive us out and cut us off in detail.”  General [John] Beatty watched from the top of Lookout Mountain and saw “far off to the east long lines of dust trending slowly to the south, and inferred from this that Bragg had abandoned Chattanooga and was either retiring before us or making preparations to check the center and right of our line.”

On September 10, [General] Thomas reluctantly ordered Negley to push his division across McLemore’s Cove and over Pigeon Mountain through Dug Gap.  Negley revealed his own unease by urging Brigadier General Absalom Baird to hurry his division across Lookout Mountain to support him.

That morning dawned bright, promising another hot day. McLemore’s Cove spread out before the division in cedar thickets and rolling hills.  Few people inhabited the narrow valley, which the west branch of Chickamauga Creek bisected from south to north.  Negley described the valley: “Agricultural products and water are abundant…  The country through which the road passes is peculiarly well suited for ambuscades; innumerable bridle-paths branch off, sometimes leading up the mountain.”  Confident that the nearest Confederates were at Dug Gap, across the cove, Negley rode to the head of the column.  Perhaps the beauty of the place distracted the former horticulturist, for Negley did not order any skirmishers thrown forward.  Suddenly, Confederate pickets sent bullets whining close to the general, and he wheeled back toward the vanguard–the 78th Pennsylvania of Colonel William Sirwell’s brigade–shouting to the Pennsylvanians’ commander, “Into line, Colonel!  Into line!”

The pickets belonged to the lead elements of Major General Patrick R. Cleburne’s division, which was holding Dug Gap.  Bragg had recognized the opportunity to crush Negley while he was isolated in the cove.  Three divisions under Major General Thomas Hindman were to sweep down upon Negley’s left flank from the northeast while Cleburne’s division attacked from the gap.

Bragg’s plan began to fall apart even before his troops could execute it.  Orders to Cleburne’s corps commander, Lt. General Daniel H. Hill, did not arrive until 4:30 a.m. on the 10th, hours after they were written.  Hill reported that Cleburne could be of no immediate help–not only was Cleburne’s division spread across Pigeon Mountain on picket duty, but it would also take hours to clear away the obstructions that Confederate cavalry had placed at Dug Gap.  Bragg augmented Hindman’s force with two divisions from Maj. General Simon Buckner’s corps. But these two units were farther to the north, and Hindman, leery of the size of the Federal force, halted his advance to wait for the reinforcements.

Later on September 10, Sergeant [James] King of the 11th Michigan reported, “On reaching the vicinity of [Dug Gap] it was discovered that the obstructions had been removed and that a large force of the enemy had passed through during the night and were deploying in line of battle.”  Alfred Hough added, “Until we reached a gap debouching from Pigeon Mountain we were not held in check.  Here while attempting to force our way through at Dug Gap it was discovered that the enemy were pouring over Pigeon Mountain on both our flanks.”

Cleburne had arrived earlier than his commanders had expected. Brigadier General S.A.M. Wood’s brigade made up the vanguard of the division, followed by Brigadier General James Deshler’s Texas brigade.  When a Confederate officer was taken prisoner by Negley’s forces, he warned that if the Federals advanced they would be whipped.  According to Hough, “He was so defiant in his manner and boasted so loudly that we would have our hands full before we got through the ridge that [Negley] was led to suspect what really proved to be the truth in regard to the enemy.”  Negley decided to retreat.

When Thomas arrived near Davis’ Crossroads, where Negley had set up a defensive line, he concurred with Negley’s decision to fall back from the gap.  Rumors filtered in about Hindman’s approach from the northeast.  Ever cautious, but not apt to overreact, Thomas sent orders to hurry along his remaining two divisions by way of Cooper’s Gap.

Night closed in.  Originally, the 11th Michigan held the center of Negley’s divisional line, but as King explained:  “On the morning of September 11, about three o’clock, the regiment changed position to the extreme right of the line, and upon throwing out skirmishers, the enemy was soon afterwards engaged.  A spirited contest ensued.  The enemy at daybreak attempted to turn Negley’s right and thereby cut off his line of retreat.  The 11th again changed its position to the right and rear, where it threw up a strong barricade of logs and rails.  Sections of a battery were placed upon each flank.  Meanwhile, heavy skirmishing continued along the whole line.”  Rumors swirled among the men of being outnumbered 5-to-1 by the Confederates.

Stay tuned for Part 3 of this article.

“CONGRATULATIONS! IT’S A BOOK!”

To paraphrase one of my favorite literary characters, Stephen Maturin:  “I give you joy!”  And in this case the joy is all mine.  And why is that, you ask?  Because The Prodigal has found a publishing home.

I recently signed a book deal with Fireship Press.  I’m looking forward to working with Michael James and the crew at Fireship to bring Jack Mallory to a wide audience of readers.  Those of you who know me well know this has been a long journey, so that makes this all the sweeter.

As soon as I have a release date, I will post it here.  Thanks to all who have supported my writing endeavors over the years.  And a special thanks to Alaric “Jim” Bond for championing my cause with Mr. James.  Make sure you check out his “Fighting Sail” series on Amazon.com and other bookseller websites.  I’m thoroughly enjoying the series right now myself.

PRELUDE TO CHICKAMAUGA

As I’ve mentioned before, I’m in the process of reworking a Civil War novel I wrote back in the ’90s (while at the same time still working on Jack Mallory’s tales), so I thought I would share an article of mine that was published in the July 1998 issue of America’s Civil War magazine. When I had originally submitted it for consideration with the magazine, they had asked me to expand it so they could use it as a feature story. Drawing from the many sources I had used while researching my novel (The Edge of Hell), I happily obliged. The article is reproduced here in parts.

This article covers a small battle that was fought prior to the battle of Chickamauga, near a remote crossroads in northern Georgia. A small battle yet, like pieces in a larger puzzle, one piece builds upon another until the larger picture is seen. I’ve always “puzzled” over how little has been written about the battle of Davis’ Crossroads, and it was this void that I hoped to fill with my article.

NEAR MISS AT DAVIS’ CROSS ROADS

“Let the memory take a step backward to September 8, 1863, and we find the 11th Michigan, the vanguard of [Major General George H.] Thomas’ army corps, on the top of Lookout Mountain at the head of Stevens’ Gap. The passage down the mountain was blocked by fallen timber. A detail was made under Lieutenant S.P.Marsh to clear the obstructions. This was done and the regiment reached the foot of the pass in [Mc]Lemore’s Cove at two o’clock p.m., it being the first Union force to reach the valley in rear of Chattanooga.”

Thus began an oration by Sergeant James W. King of the 11th Michigan Infantry. He delivered this speech years after the Battle of Chickamauga, when soldiers from both armies returned to the battlefield to dedicate their unit monuments. King knew–as did many others–that the true beginning of the great struggle in north Georgia had taken place days before the actual battle.

The 11th Michigan was indeed the first unit of Major General William S. Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland to descend into the valley east of Lookout Mountain and south of Chattanooga. The rest of the army was precariously spread out across the treacherous mountain passes as Rosecrans pursued General Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee south from the strategic rail hub of Chattanooga. The 11th Michigan, a veteran unit of the Battle of Stones River, where it suffered 31 percent casualties, found little Confederate resistance beyond Stevens’ Gap. The regiment–numbering barely more than 400 men–pushed back the small force of Rebels confronting it.

“Toward night the command took position at the base of Lookout and formed in lines in a semicircle around the foot of Stevens’ Gap,” King recalled. “About half the command were on picket that night and the rest lay on their arms and were soon asleep. At midnight a staff officer came down the mountain with orders from [Major General James] Negley for Colonel [William] Stoughton to march his command to the top of the mountain [to rejoin the division]. Both officers and men protested, but, as the orders were imperative, the regiment formed in line and reached the summit at two o’clock in the morning [of September 9].”

Stoughton commanded the 11th Michigan. The men of the regiment held the 36-year-old lawyer from Sturgis, Michigan, in high regard. After the Battle of Stones River (December 31, 1862 – January 1, 1863), Ira Gillespie of Company A had written, “Colonel Stoughton won from his men that esteem that will last while life lasts.” A year and a half later, during the Atlanta campaign, the men of the 11th would weep as their beloved colonel, grievously wounded by a shell, was borne along the battle line. His life was saved, but he would lose a leg and leave the service. On that September night at Stevens’ Gap, Stoughton–always mindful of his men–regretted having to countermarch the regiment back up the mountain after such a long day of hard work. Stoughton would have agreed with 1st Brigade commander Brigadier General John Beatty’s assessment of travel in the area: “The roads up and down the mountain are extremely bad; our progress has therefore been slow and the march hither a tedious one.”

Colonel Timothy R. Stanley’s 2nd Brigade, to which the 11th Michigan belonged, returned to McLemore’s Cove on the morning of the 9th, followed by the balance of Negley’s division, its artillery and supply train. When Negley ordered a reconnaissance toward Pigeon Mountain, the Union forces discovered that Dug Gap was heavily barricaded and protected by an unexpected Confederate force. Isolated in McLemore’s Cove, Negley’s division fell back to the safety of Stevens’ Gap to bivouac for the night.

Rosecrans, however, wanted nothing less than continuous pursuit of the Confederate forces. He was confident that Bragg’s troops were in headlong retreat toward Rome, Georgia. Negley’s hesitancy irritated Rosecrans, who complained to Negley’s immediate superior, George Thomas, commanding the XIV Corps. Thomas supported his subordinate in correspondence to the commanding general: “The difficulties of the ascent and descent of Lookout Mountain, together with the obstructions placed in the road by the enemy were such that I do not see how it was possible for him to advance farther or more rapidly than he has.” Rosecrans, however, insisted that Thomas order Negley to continue the eastward movement toward Pigeon Mountain.

(Stay tuned for Part 2)